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May 20th, 2010Uncategorized……order=”0″ height=”two00″ src=”http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_EU1pq6GZ8ps/S_FvE6jlIxI/AAAAAAAACak/-VeglrxuHJA/s200/langdon.JPG” width=”171″ wt=”true” />A attorney for an Aussie man sentenced to year-for-drug/”>death for slaying in afghanistan says his client menagewill effort to have the mind overturned by paying compensation to the victim family.
Henry M. Robert Langdon’s predicament began when he shot dead an afghan co-worker while reportedly workings as a contractor for US-based security firm Four equestrian International
Langdon , a 38-year-old former soldier in the Aussie regular army, claimed he shot the man in ego-defense reaction but an afghan tribunal/a> found him guilty of slaying in October last year and sentenced him to death by hanging
The South Australian man law%c2%a0of%c2%a0hatred/”>lawyer, Stephen Kenny, says under Islamic law the family is able to make a payment of ten of grand of dollar to a local court.
“My hope is that it will result in the death penalty approach off the table and in an ideal situation … we may be able to seek his release back to Australia,” Mr Kenny said.
He understands the payment will be offered to a local court this week, before a Supreme Court appeal is due to be heard.
“In the ibra court my apprehension is it is about the compensation, about the forgiveness of the family, which is a serious characteristic of Islamic law,” he said.
Langdon’s sister Katie Godfrey says her brother health is suffering in prison
“He has doomed over 20 kg, for him to lose 20 kilo when helium already lean, I just dread to think what he expression like now,” she said.
ten of grand of security contractor work in afghanistan and their Book of Numbers are increasing.
analyst say the presence of this common soldier regular army is a rootage of tension between afghanistan’s government/”>government and its horse opera Allies
In Recent epoch years the afghan government has allowed foreign security contractor accused of law-breaking to be dealt with in their home couneffort.
Source: rudiment News, May 17, 2010attorney flies out to afghanitan to represent death-row captive Henry M. Robert Langdon, who family says is ‘not doing well/span>
Adelaide solicitor Stephen Kenny will fly to Islamic State of Islamic State of Afghanistan today to represent death-row prisoner Robert Langdon, who is struggling to header in the harsh conditions.
Mr Kenny, Saint David yokel former solicitor, said.he had been engaged by Mr Langdon’s port Augusta-based family to aid the former security contractor lawyers in Kabul
Mr Langdon, 38, has been convicted of slayinging a lad security contractor, an Afghani.
“He’s always maintained it was ego defence … we want to make sure that even in Islamic State of Islamic State of Afghanistan he get what would be considered a fair go,” Mr Kenny told AdelaideNow.
Mr Kenny said.Mr Langdon was playacting as head of security on a convoy that had recently been attacked by the Taliban He was concerned when his lad security contractor wanted to keep the convoy stationery in an isolated area
It is alleged that the contractor John Drew his gun on Mr Langdon, who shot the contractor in self defence.
Mr Langdon was sentenced to death on October 27 last year in a hearing which Mr Emmett Kelly said had no witnesser, no treatment of evidence and no statements.
The hearing lasted less than 2 transactions
Mr Kenny said he was now hoping the “Ibra hearing”, in which Mr Langdon’s family pay the victim family a “significant” amount of money and seek forgiveness will help Mr Langdon’s plight
“We’re hoping that through this Ibra court and the subsequent court case that we can negotiate an agreement where at least the death penalty is removed and hopefully to have him ultimately released,” he said.
“Islamic law is much more generous than horse opera law because in horse opera law the family doesn’t always get the chance of obtaining some compensation and the family of the wrongdoer doesn’t get a right to seek forgiveness in this manner.”
Mr Langdon, 38, grew up on Billa Kalina station in the Storm Troops outback
He served in the regular army and the army modesty and has worked as a security contractor in Islamic State of Afghanistan since 2004.
Mr Langdon’s sister, Katie Godfrey, said her brother is not doing well.
“The whole family is very concerned about Rob’s social social welfare He has lost 20kg while he has been in gaol,” Mrs Godfrey said.
Mr Kenny said captive rely on family and friend to feed them.
“It’s very clear to us that jail is not a good place in Afghanistan but again that is a thoughtfulness on the fact information technology an extremely poor counattempt information technology extremely dangerous and jail is not seen as a precedency
“He does have some friend over there who have been working diligently to try and look after his welfare but they do find the bureaucratism difficult.”
Mr Kenny will sports meeting with Mr Langdon and his attorney and interview potentiality witnesses before returning to Sydney next Mon
Source: Adelaide Now, May 17, 2010 -
December 24th, 2009UncategorizedU.S. v. Heron-Salinas, No. 08-50276 (5-20-09). The 9th, in a per curiam, holds that a conviction for assault with a firearm under Calif. Penal Code 245(a)(2) is a categorical crime of violence and an aggravated felony for immigration purposes. The 9th considers a plain reading of the statute as satisfying the mens rea requirements of 18 U.S.C. 16(a) and (b) because the offense's elements of unlawful attempt, plus a present ability, to commit a violent injury on a person with a firearm, mean that the defendant acts in disregard for the safety of another.
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December 23rd, 2009Uncategorized
Legendary historian Howard Zinn joins us to talk about war, torture and the teaching of history. Zinn says Obama had Obama heeded the lessons of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., he wouldn’t be escalating US attacks abroad and increasing the size of the US military budget. We also play excerpts of the forthcoming documentary, The People Speak, featuring dramatic readings based on Zinn’s A People’s History of the United States and Voices of a People’s History of the United States.
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December 21st, 2009UncategorizedU.S. v. Ray, 2009 WL 1133133 (4/28/09) (unpub'd) - The 10th affirms upward variance for transporting child porn from 180-210 months to 270 months because the defendant was a danger to the public, as evidenced by a very bad psychosexual evaluation. The d. ct. adequately considered the defendant's offer to be chemically castrated by explaining its variance grounds, even though the court didn't mention the castration proposal.
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December 19th, 2009UncategorizedIn U.S. v. Schultz, No. 06-11673 (April 22, 2009), the Court affirmed fraud convictions and dismissed the defendant’s appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction.
The Court found no error in having a Magistrate Judge, as opposed to an Article III district court, decide Schultz’s Faretta motion for self-representation.
The Court noted that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the rulings of a Magistrate Judge, and therefore could not review Schultz’ challenge to the Magistrate Judge’s order denying self-representation. The Court noted that Schultz’ attorney orally objected at the commencement of trial in the district court to the lack of self-representation, and that the district court ruled "denied." However, the Court noted that Schultz’ oral motion did not alert the district court to the Magistrate Judge’s order. The Court rejected Schultz’s argument that the Magistrate Judge failed to inform him of the 10-day deadline for filing objections. The Court pointed out that the 10-day deadline notice requirement applies to reports and recomendations, not to pre-trial orders, and, further, was not yet in effect at the time of Schultz’ proceedings prior to September 2005. -
December 18th, 2009UncategorizedIn U.S. v. Emmanuel, No. 07-10378 (April 21, 2009), the Court affirmed drug trafficking convictions.
The Court rejected the argument that a wiretap of the defendants under Bahamian law so "shocked the conscience" as to warrant suppression of its fruits, because no neutral magistrate need approve the wiretap. The Court noted that the "shock the judicial conscience" standard is meant to protect against conduct that violates "fundamental international norms of decency." Fundamental international norms of decency do not require judicial review in all jurisdictions of applications to intercept wire communications. Therefore, the Bahamian wiretap is not excludable.
The Court also rejected the argument that the United States so involved itself with the Bahamian government in the wiretap that the Fourth Amendment applied. The Court noted that Emmanual was a nonresident alien entirely outside the United States. The Fourth Amendment therefore could not apply, regardless of United States involvement. The Court distinguished U.S.v. Behety, on the ground that it involved a resident alien and a U.S. citizen. The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to the interception of wire communications in the Bahamas of a Bahamian resident.
The Court rejected hearsay and Confrontation Clause challenges to the admission at trial of the Bahamian government’s approval of the wiretap, finding that admission of this evidence, even if error, did not substantially affect the trial.
The Court also found no prejudice in the district court’s admission of police officer testimony that he recognized the defendant’s voice from having heard it at the defendant’s condition of bail hearing. The comment was a brief reference during a relatively long trial.
The government offered a police officer as an expert to interpret drug codes and jargon used in taped conversations. The Court rejected Emmanuel’s Rule 702 challenge to this testimony, finding that drug codes and jargon are proper subjects of expert testimony. The Court recognized that such testimony "may unfairly provide the government with an additional summation by having the expert interpret the evidence, and may come dangerously close to invading the province of the jury. Here,"most" of the testimony "was specific and closely related to [the] interpretation of drug codes and jargon." But "some" of the testimony "went beyond interpreting code words to interpret conversations as a whole." Nevertheless, it was unlikely this affected Emmanuel’s substantial rights, because the judge emphasized that the jury will determine whether the testimony is credible. In addition, based on Emmanuel’s own incriminating statements on tape, the jury "could have easily interpreted the coded conversations as involving drugs based on other evidence in the case, including actual seizures of drugs and drug money and testimony from coconspirators." Any error, therefore, did not require reversal. -
December 17th, 2009UncategorizedIn United States v. Laboy-Torres, No. 08-1220, the defendant challenged his conviction for making a false statement to a licensed firearms dealer under 18 U.S.C. §922(a)(6), arguing that his previous conviction in Puerto Rico was not a domestic conviction under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1).
The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that the government failed to adequately allege the materiality element of 18 U.S.C. §922(a)(6). Citing Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005), the defendant argued that his Puerto Rican conviction was “foreign” and not “domestic,” and therefore it could not serve as a qualifying predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1). According to the defendant, the existence of his Puerto Rican conviction was not material to the lawfulness of the sale because the foreign conviction did not make it illegal for him to purchase a firearm under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1). The trial court denied the defendant’s motion, ruling that his Puerto Rican conviction was domestic. The defendant pled guilty on the condition that he could appeal the trial court’s denial of his dismissal motion.
Retired Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, sitting by designation, wrote the opinion for the Court. Justice O’Connor determined that Small was inapplicable to the case because, unlike the Japanese conviction at issue in Small, the defendant’s Puerto Rican conviction was in fact “domestic.” In Small, the Supreme Court recognized a presumption that Congress intends its statutes to prohibit only domestic, not foreign, conduct. Consequently, Congress must also intend only domestic criminal acts to serve as predicate offenses for its statutes.
Justice O’Connor recognized that, as the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico was in essence a “State,” federal laws applied to Puerto Rican conduct. Therefore, based upon the presumption discussed in Small, the defendant’s Puerto Rican conviction was in fact domestic and therefore could serve as a qualifying predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). As a result, Justice O’Connor affirmed the defendant’s conviction. -
August 8th, 2009UncategorizedThe Third Circuit today reaffirmed that, in applying statutes of limitations in the conspiracy context, the critical issue is the scope of the conspiracy charged in the indicment--not, necessarily, the dates of the overt acts recited. In U.S. v. Bornman, No. 07-3447 (3/6/09), the Court was faced with an indictment charging two conspiracies to commit bribery (18 U.S.C. s 371 and 666(a)(1)(B)). The indictment described the object of the first conspiracy as "to enrich [defendants] by corruptly soliciting and accepting payments from contractors with the intent of being influenced . . . ." It also recited six overt acts, including solicitation and acceptance of payments as well as (1) the return of one of the payments as a "loan," and (2) the refusal to return another of the payments as a "loan." Only these last two overt acts fell within the 5-year limitations period, however.
The Court held that, because the conspiracy was charged as having a simple solicit/accept object, the conspiracy was complete when that occurred and the later return or refusal to return the payments as "loans" could not have furthered the conspiracy as charged. The statute of limitations had therefore run, and the defendant's convictions on the first conspiracy count, as well as on the underlying extortion counts, were vacated. The second conspiracy count charged a later conspiracy, which was not time-barred. The Court upheld the defendant's conviction on that count against a sufficiency-0f-the-evidence challenge.
Perhaps inadvertently, the Court also dropped a bombshell by stating without analysis that section 666 bribery does not require proof of a quid pro quo. This issue has not previously been addressed in this circuit, is the subject of a split among others, was not actually at issue in Bornman -- and, in result, is arguably inconsistent with the Third Circuit's decision in U.S. v. Kemp. The Court's cite to the Supreme Court's decision in Sabri v. U.S., 541 U.S. 600 (2004) suggests that it confused the federal nexus issue (i.e., the government need not show a link between the official act in question and the federal funds that provide the jurisdictional hook) with the quid pro quo issue (i.e., the government does need to show a link -- an exchange -- between the official act and the thing of value).
The Court also turned away the defendant's challenge to the denial of his severance motion, reaffirming that the difficult standard for severance is not met by a showing that the evidence in a case is most damaging with respect to only certain counts. -
August 6th, 2009UncategorizedU.S. v. Paul, No. 08-30125 (4-2-09). The defendant had embezzled some federal funds: it was her first offense, she returned the funds, she apologized profusely before charges were filed, and she explained that she had taken the funds because she felt, wrongly, that it was compensation for work she had done for the school district. The court nonetheless gave her a 16 month sentence! The judge, the Hon. Sam E. Haddon, D. Mont., explained that it was for abuse of trust. The 9th found that the sentence was unreasonable, and had vacated and remanded, explaining that the court had to more closely look at the mitigating factors. The court, upon resentencing, still focused on the abuse of trust, and gave a 15 month sentence. The 9th (per curiam with Reinhardt and M. Smith) found the sentence again to be unreasonable. The 9th put down the marker that the reasonableness of a sentence is an inquiry, and that the appellate courts can say, in specific cases, that the sentence is too much. Moreover, the court did not appear to give sufficient, if any, weight to the recognized mitigation specifically found by the 9th. The case is also reassigned to a different judge because of the appearance for justice. In a dissent, Hall argues that the recent cases of Gall and Rita focus on the individualization of a sentence, and that is what took place here. The dissent would uphold the sentence as reasonable for the reasons stated, even if the 9th disagreed. The dissent seems to adopt the approach, championed by Scalia and Thomas, that focuses on procedure and not substance in appellate review. The response would be that a sentence still has to be rational and reasonable, and indicate a weighing of 3553 factors.
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August 5th, 2009UncategorizedToday, a panel of the Sixth ruled in U.S. v. Baker, that reckless endangerment under Tennessee law does not qualify as a crime of violence for career offender and ACCA purposes. The Sixth found that since reckless endangerment by its definition penalizes reckless, rather than intentional, conduct it does not qualify as a crime of violence after Begay.
However, there is one troubling aspect about this opinion. The panel remands the case and allows that the district court, "may consider any of the additional factual evidence on remand, provided, of course, that it is limited to the 'charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented.'" This seems to confuse the analysis of Shepard. Under Shepard, the prosecution does not get to present this additional evidence unless there is a possibility that the statutory definition of the crime penalizes both crimes of violence and non-crimes of violence. Think generic v. non-generic burglary. So if Begay requires that the predicate offense criminalize intentional conduct for it to qualify as a c.o.v., and reckless endangerment only criminalizes reckless conduct, why is there a need for additional fact finding? It would seem that the statutory definition would make any further factual finding pointless, in that the statutory definition does not criminalize any crime that could ever qualify as intentional conduct.
While this is just one troubling aspect of an otherwise good opinion, it makes me wonder if the Sixth can envision any way that reckless endangerment could qualify as a c.o.v.
